Chinese writer and researcher Ding Yuen asserted in an article published in Foreign Policy magazine that Chinese President Xi Jinping is rewriting the country's official historical narrative and placing himself in a historical position independent of his predecessors.
According to Yuen, in a speech on the 105th founding anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party on July 1, Xi divided the party's history into four stages: revolution, construction, reform, and the 'new era.' This classification formally separates the period that began with Xi's rise to power in 2012 from the reform era initiated by Deng Xiaoping in 1978.
The author notes that this distinction is not merely a historical label but carries deep political meaning. Recalling that reform and opening-up were previously seen as an ongoing process, and even that Xi had once said reform was 'still on the way,' Yuen emphasizes that the designation of the 'new era' as an independent stage means the reform era has officially come to an end.
According to the article, the CCP's internal periodization is closely tied to the distribution of political legitimacy. Mao Zedong is identified with the stages of revolution and state construction, while the reform era is associated with Deng Xiaoping; this legacy is also shared by former leaders Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, who deepened the economic opening.
Ding Yuen argues that Xi is focused on transcending Deng's legacy rather than competing directly with Mao. Using the formulation, 'If Deng answered the question of how China could become wealthy, Xi presents himself as the one who answers the question of how China can become powerful,' the author points out that power and national security have been placed at the top of state priorities.
According to the writer, the announcement that the reform era has ended does not mean reform discourse has been completely abandoned. Although the Chinese leadership still puts forward plans to deepen reforms, reform is no longer a political value in its own right or the name of a historical era; it has become a tool serving the objectives of the 'new era' set by Xi.
While Deng-era reforms gradually freed the economy and society from political pressure, encouraged opening up to the world, and benefited from Western experience, Xi's reforms emphasize national security, party leadership, self-reliance, and Chinese modernization, and increase party and state control over the economy and society.
This transformation is also reflected in official discourse. Slogans such as 'emancipate the mind,' 'open up to the world,' and 'let some people get rich first' have been replaced by concepts like 'comprehensive leadership of the party,' 'security,' 'struggle,' 'self-confidence,' 'common prosperity,' and 'the rise of the East and the decline of the West.'
Ding Yuen notes that China has not abandoned the word 'reform,' but has radically altered its meaning. According to him, reform, which for decades formed the basis of the ruling party's legitimacy, no longer dictates China's present and future; it has become subordinated to the priorities of the 'new era.'
