Professor Toğrul İsmayıl, a faculty member in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences of Kahramanmaraş Sütçü İmam University, assessed the impact of the Russia-Ukraine war on the Black Sea and Türkiye’s role in the region.
According to İsmayıl, the conflict in the Black Sea can no longer be considered solely an engagement between the naval forces of Russia and Ukraine. Rising risks to commercial vessels, ports, energy facilities and maritime transport are extending the war’s economic and geopolitical effects beyond the region.
Risks to commercial shipping are growing
İsmayıl said Ukraine has sought to weaken Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, energy infrastructure and logistics operations conducted by sea, while Russia has targeted Ukrainian ports, grain terminals and the country’s maritime export capacity.
İsmayıl said incidents involving commercial vessels should not all be assessed in the same category. While claims have emerged that vessels were directly targeted in some incidents, he noted that other developments may have been linked to attacks on ports or nearby military and economic infrastructure.
İsmayıl emphasized that the Black Sea is a strategic economic area where grain, energy, raw materials and trade routes intersect. He assessed that security crises could increase insurance and freight costs, alter maritime routes and affect supply chains.
İsmayıl also said that in a war environment involving unmanned surface vessels, long-range missiles and advanced surveillance technologies, the boundary between military targets and commercial activity could become blurred.
Proposal for a multilateral model for a safe corridor
İsmayıl said the idea of establishing a safe maritime corridor in the Black Sea had regained importance, but argued that it was unrealistic for Türkiye to act as the sole provider of military security. He said such a role could risk making Türkiye a de facto party to the war.
İsmayıl proposed that a multilateral mechanism led by Türkiye and involving Russia, Ukraine and the United Nations would be more feasible. He said the Black Sea Grain Initiative established in 2022 through the efforts of Türkiye and the United Nations, along with the Joint Coordination Centre in Istanbul, showed that the parties could agree on a common maritime mechanism, even if only to a limited extent.
İsmayıl said the proposed new model should be based on mutual non-aggression commitments, with routes determined in advance and commercial vessel movements monitored through a common system. His recommendations also included technical coordination on mine and maritime security, as well as the establishment of an international monitoring mechanism to detect possible violations.
Türkiye’s diplomatic role
İsmayıl said Türkiye is one of the few actors able to communicate with Russia and Ukraine simultaneously. He assessed that Türkiye’s responsibility for the İstanbul and Çanakkale straits under the Montreux Convention also gives the country strategic weight in terms of Black Sea security.
In this framework, İsmayıl argued that Türkiye’s role should be defined not as the corridor’s military guarantor, but as the diplomatic architect of a new security architecture in the Black Sea.
According to İsmayıl, Moscow and Kyiv must be convinced that the safe corridor will not be used against their interests. He therefore said the system should not depend on one party trusting another, but on ensuring that none of the parties can exploit the mechanism for its own military purposes.
İsmayıl said United Nations oversight, Türkiye’s facilitation and the parties’ mutual commitments could form a complementary structure. He said the maritime security crisis in the Black Sea could simultaneously affect energy, food, trade and transport security, adding that Türkiye’s priority should not be to side with one of the parties, but to establish the diplomatic basis for turning the region back into a predictable and secure trading area.
