Israel’s strike on Abu Zuhur Air Base in Idlib has revived security tensions between Türkiye and Israel in Syria. Dr. Ömer Behram Özdemir, a faculty member at Ibn Haldun University, assessed the background to the strike and Türkiye’s possible position in Syria policy.
Özdemir said the base was empty when the strike took place and had not yet entered a renovation or reconstruction process. He said this limited the likelihood of casualties and extensive material damage.
Abu Zuhur’s strategic location
Located 70 kilometers from the Turkish border, Abu Zuhur Air Base became one of the key centers in the struggle for control between the Assad regime and opposition groups during the Syrian civil war. Its location, runways and expansive grounds give it the potential to become one of northern Syria’s important air bases.
Özdemir wrote that plans were in place to expand the base’s capacity and bring it back into operation during Syria’s new phase, with elements of the Turkish Armed Forces expected to be stationed there under the security agreement between Ankara and Damascus. He also noted that Israel targeted the T4 Base in Homs with airstrikes in 2025, where Turkish Armed Forces personnel were similarly expected to be deployed.
Claims about the strike and the official statement
Following the strike, some international media organizations claimed that a Turkish military delegation had been in and around the base area several hours before the attack. The Ministry of National Defense denied the claim and said Israel must end its actions in the area and across Syria in the interests of Syria’s stability.
Özdemir argued that the Israeli government views Türkiye’s political and military presence in Syria as a threat. He further claimed that Türkiye’s influence in Syria had been raised during Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s visits to the United States over the past two years.
Messages exchanged between the United States and Israel
According to Özdemir’s assessment, Netanyahu allegedly argued during his latest visit to the United States that Türkiye was operating across a wider area in Syria than Israel. He said U.S. President Donald Trump responded that Türkiye’s presence in Syria, unlike Israel’s, was based on an official invitation.
Özdemir drew attention to the fact that the strike took place after U.S. Ambassador Tom Barrack met with Syria’s Foreign Minister Asaad Hassan al-Shaibani in Istanbul and after statements that President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan would visit Syria. He assessed that these developments could represent a message to Türkiye and the United States from Israel.
Türkiye’s possible approach
Özdemir said the strike had once again demonstrated the need for a functioning conflict-prevention mechanism between Türkiye and Israel. He argued that Türkiye could prefer to balance Israel in Syria through the United States as much as possible and that this would be more effective for Syria’s stability and reconstruction process.
He argued that cooperation between the reconstituted Syrian army and the Turkish Armed Forces, including military training, intelligence sharing and joint exercises, could increase Ankara’s influence in Syria. He suggested that actions such as the Abu Zuhur strike could disrupt the process in the short term but could produce negative consequences for Israel’s objectives in the region in the medium and long term.
Özdemir also assessed that Israel could increasingly view Türkiye’s political and military presence in the region as a threat and that Türkiye-focused narratives could become more prominent in Israel’s domestic and foreign policy. He further suggested that efforts to counterbalance Türkiye through Greece, using Cyprus and the Aegean islands, could also become more visible.
In conclusion, Özdemir argued that Türkiye should continue its policy of staying out of the conflict and strengthening its allies in the region. He said that, for Syria’s future and regional stability, energy should be directed toward institution-building and development rather than conflict.
